effects of coinsurance on demand for physician services
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effects of coinsurance on demand for physician services

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Published by Rand in Santa Monica, Calif .
Written in English

Subjects:

Places:

  • California,
  • Palo Alto.,
  • Palo Alto

Subjects:

  • Health maintenance organizations -- California -- Palo Alto,
  • Physician services utilization -- California -- Palo Alto,
  • Medical fees -- California -- Palo Alto,
  • Insurance, Health -- California -- Palo Alto -- Coinsurance

Book details:

Edition Notes

Other titlesCoinsurance on demand for physician services.
Statement[by] Charles E. Phelps and Joseph P. Newhouse.
Series[Rand Corporation., R-976-OEO
ContributionsNewhouse, Joseph P., joint author., United States. Office of Economic Opportunity.
Classifications
LC ClassificationsAS36 .R3 R-976, RA413.5.U6 .R3 R-976
The Physical Object
Paginationix, 21 p.
Number of Pages21
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL3914889M
LC Control Number81481000

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Effect of Coinsurance on Use of Physician Services This study is concerned with the impact of the introductio*z of a percent coinsurance provision on the demand for physacian services under a comprehensive prepaid plan of medical care. The study findings show lhat this provision led to a subatantzal decline in the demand for such services. Title: The Effects of Coinsurance on Demand for Physician Services Author: Charles E. Phelps Subject: Analyzes effects of coinsurance on demand for physician by: Cqinsurance and the Demand fo’r Physician Services: Four Years Later IN,O the authors conducted a study of the unpnct of the mtroductlon of a comsurance pro- ns~on on the use of physnan and outpatlent anallary services under a comprehensive prepaid plan . T I HE effect of coinsurance on the demand for medical services has been debated for many years. Some assert that it helps control total expenditures by giving consumers a stake in how much medical care is purchased. Others assert that coinsurance is irrelevant to choice, since the physician makes the decisions about using medical services for.

1. Soc Secur Bull. May;40(5) Coinsurance and the demand for physician services: four years later. Scitovsky AA, McCall N. In a study was made of the effects of a percent coinsurance provision on the demand for physician services under a . Demand for medical services • Like any other good, medical services are effects – Shift demand – Make less/more price responsive. 5 17 Poor health could How coinsurance changes demand • Qd = f(P) where P is price paid by the consumer • Coinsurance changes this. Now there is a. Figure illustrates what happens to the demand for physician services when income increases. The increase in income causes the demand curve to shift to the right, from d 0 to d 1, because at each price the consumer is willing and able to purchase more physician services. Similarly, for each quantity of medical services, the consumer is. coinsurance rate (insurance pays for everything), demand would be 9 units since P=$0. With a $15 price and a $9 copay, each prescription costs $9, so they would demand 9=Q, or 36=5Q and q= 5. The graph is at the end of the handout. Demand without insurance is P d =Q and the graph is illustrated by line (ab).

Additional Physical Format: Online version: Phelps, Charles E. Coinsurance and the demand for medical services. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, Effect of Coinsurance on Use of Physician Services by ANNE A. SCITOVSKY and NELDA M. SNYDER* This study is concerned with the impact of the introduction of a peroent coinsurance provision on the demand for physician services under a comprehensive prepaid plan of medical care. The study findings show that this provision led to a substantial decline in the demand for such services.   A physician shortage occurs when there are not enough physicians available to meet patient demand. The World Health Organization (WHO) has defined physician shortages as having less than 80 percent of the physicians needed to meet provider demand. When a physician shortage occurs, patients are unable to access the care they need. profit-maximizing physicians cannot shift demand, but they can affect healthcare quantities by making take-it-or-leave-it offers of nonretradeable services or by altering their choice of quality or effort (McGuire, ). This means observing quantities that depart from the patient’s optimum is not suf-ficient evidence of PID.